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Abstract The title refers to the question addressed in
this paper, namely, to what degree if any technology,
including nanotechnologies, in the form of products
and processes, is capable of contributing to a good
life. To answer that question, the paper will develop
a meta-normative model whose primary purpose is
to determine the essential conditions that any
normative theory of the Good Life and Technology
(T-GLAT) must adequately address in order to be
able to account for, explain and evaluate the
Contributive Capability of Technology for a Good
Life (CCT-GL). By CCT-GL understand the capa-
bility of any technological product or process in its
design and/or its use to contribute in some way, if
any, to the good life of individuals and society at
large. In this paper, the all-embracing term “tech-
nology” will be used to refer to both the products
and processes of different technologies.
Keywords Technology.Goodlife.Wisdom.Ethics.
Justification.Motivation.Sustainability.Eudaimonia
Introduction
In an entry in the International Encyclopedia of
Ethics (“Ethics of Nanotechnology”) John Weckert
[9] writes that,
Nanotechnologies, …involves consideration of
what ought to be researched and developed and
whether the precautionary principle should be
applied in some areas, and this in turn encour-
ages examination, or re-examination, of some
basic issues in the ethics and philosophy of
technology and science: What is the purpose
of technology? Can technological research
and development be directed externally, and
if it can be, should it be, and by whom?
What is human flourishing, or “the good
life”, and how can technology contribute to
this? These questions are larger than nano-
ethics but if the ethics of nanotechnology are
to be discussed usefully, they cannot be
separated from those discussions.
I concur fully with that assessment and its
sentiment concerning not only nanotechnologies but
all technologies, and particularly emerging technolo-
gies more generally. The primary aim of this paper is
to address a general question in the philosophy of
technology, namely, to what degree if any, technology,
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processes,iscompetentincontributingtoagoodlife.To
answer that question, the paper will develop a meta-
normativemodelwhoseprimarypurposeistodetermine
the essential conditions that any normative theory of the
Good Life and Technology (T-GLAT) must adequately
address in order to be able to account for, explain, and
evaluate the Contributive Capability of Technology for
the Good Life (CCT-GL). By CCT-GL understand the
capability of any technological product or process in its
designand/oritsusetocontributeinsomeway,ifany,to
the good life of individuals and society at large.
In this paper, the all-embracing term “technology”
will be used to refer to both the products and
processes of different technologies, including nano-
technologies. Insofar as the central meta-question
addressed in this paper, whether and how technolo-
gies contribute to a good life, applies to all technol-
ogies, it also applies to nanotechnologies. For their
value will also be assessed on the basis of their
capability for contributing to a good life. So any
adequate theory of the Good Life and Technology
should be capable of evaluating all technologies,
including nanotechnologies.
There are at least two necessary methodological
meta-conditions that any normative theory of the
Good Life and Technology (T-GLAT) must meet. I
will refer to those conditions as the formal condition
and the material condition.
The Formal Meta-Condition
The formal meta-condition characterizes the neces-
sary structural form of a T-GLAT’s theoretical
framework. It comprises at least three general norma-
tive categories that any T-GLAT must of necessity
include within its theoretical framework, so as to be
both theoretically and practically adequate. Those
formal normative categories are motivation, justifica-
tion and compliance. For if it lacks justification
rational agents will have no reason to be convinced
of its rational authority and if it lacks sufficient
motivation, agents will not be pre-disposed to act in
accordance with its prescriptions. Therefore, rational
agents shall have no reason to offer their rational
allegiance to a T-GLAT that lacks rational cogency.
Finally, compliance is practically necessary if the
prescriptions of a T-GLAT are to be capable of
leading to social and political action through
T-GLAT informed policies. In summary the three
formal meta-conditions are:
I. Justification—that which is adequately provided
by rational arguments, capable of convincing any
putative rationalagent thatthey havegoodrational
reasons or grounds for accepting and acknowledg-
ing the rational authority of certain precepts, rules,
principles and values.
II. Motivation—that which motivates any putative
rational autonomous agent to accept and acknowl-
edge certain precepts, rules, principles and values,
and moreover be adequately motivated to act in
accordance with them.
III. Compliance—both motivation and justification
are necessary for actual compliance with any
T-GLATso that it results in action or practice but
not sufficient. This is because of at least two
reasons: Firstly, weakness of the will of individual
agents (individual akrasia) or weakness of the
will of a collective or group of individuals
(social akrasia); and secondly, lack of political
will in the form of the inadequacy or lack of
appropriate policies that encourage and promote
compliance with adequate policies, informed and
supported by any T-GLAT, which otherwise meets
the motivation and justification conditions.
The Material Meta-Condition
The material condition characterizes the necessary
content that any T-GLAT must address and include,
both in its conceptual explanation and practical
application. It comprises at least eight essential
minimal conditions that any T-GLAT that seeks to
evaluate the Contributive Capability of any Technology
to the Good Life (CCT-GL) must adequately address:
1. Capacity to address desires
2. Capacity to meet needs
3. Capacity to provide means-ends satisfaction
(instrumental satisfaction)
4. Capacity to contribute to valuable-ends
5. Capacity to preserve and promote moral rights
6. Capacity to be sustainable
7. Capacity to lead to the attainment of eudaimonia
8. Capacity to be practical in providing the ground
for formulating policies in enabling compliance
through its implementation and application.
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detail in Section "Determining the Adequacy of
Theories of the Good Life and Technology".
The Two Theses of the Paper in Summary
The above schema shows in outline how the formal
conditions of justification, motivation and compliance
are expressed and closely inter-linked contextually
with the eight material conditions of the meta-model
proposed. Using this meta-model the paper will argue
for and support two inter-related theses:
(A) Any Theory of the Good Life and Technology
(T-GLAT), whether desire-satisfaction theory,
objectivist theory or capability theory, amongst
others, must be capable of at least addressing
and accounting for the two formal and material
meta-conditions outlined above. Insofar as any
T-GLAT fails todoso, itisnot anadequatetheory.
(B) An adequate T-GLAT theory to be proposed in
this paper is the Eudaimonic Model for Evalu-
ating the Goodness of Technology (EMEGOT)
based on the notion of Wisdom [4]. The paper
will provide arguments to demonstrate and
support the case for such a theory but without
excluding the possibility that other theories that
meet the necessary formal and material con-
ditions outlined above might also prove suc-
cessful. As such, the paper takes a pluralistic
methodological approach to the research ques-
tion addressed in this paper.
Determining the Adequacy of Theories of the Good
Life and Technology
Theories of the good life and technology (T-GLAT
theories) irrespective of their specific content are
collectively defined in this paper as theories whose
primary purpose is to demonstrate how technologies
(any technology) contribute to a good life. These
theories seek to address the theoretical question posed
in this paper, namely, whether and in what manner
technologies are good for us in enabling us to live
good lives. A basic theoretical assumption in this
paper is that insofar as technologies are designed for
the purpose of improving our lives then they must in
some way contribute to the goodness of our lives.
That is, technologies must, at least in some minimal
sense, make a contribution in enabling us as individ-
uals and as a society to live a good life. For if they
made no such contribution, what would they be good
for? Such technologies would be at best useless or at
worst, bad. However, given the aforementioned
material condition of sustainability even a technology
that was not directly bad for us could still be viewed
as bad in some minimal sense if it was shown not to
be sustainable.
What is a Good Life?
We can say quite reasonably that a good life generally
is one that is at least minimally capable of enabling a
person to attain self-fulfilment,
1 well-being or happi-
ness. I will for methodological convenience use the
general term eudaimonia
2 to include and refer to all
those concepts collectively whilst maintaining the
original intended meaning for that term by the ancient
Greek philosophers, including Plato, Aristotle, and
the Hellenistic philosophers and in particular the
Stoics and the Epicureans ([7], Ch. 10). Although
those philosophers might have explained the notion
and attainment of eudaimonia in different ways they
all at least agreed that the virtues were essential for
the attainment of a eudaimonic or a flourishing life
and moreover the virtues were constitutive of such a
life. For insofar as eudaimonia is our ultimate object
in life as Aristotle claimed, it is difficult to conceive a
life that was not at least capable of leading to the
attainment of eudaimonia, as good—what would it be
good for if it were incapable of at least in principle
enabling one to realize one’s ultimate objective in
1 For an extensive discussion of self-fulfillment and how it
relates to a good life see [2]. In his [7] (Chapter 10), Spence
argues that Gewirth’s theory of self-fulfillment is very similar in
key aspects to Stoic eudaimonia.
2 For the purpose of this paper I will use the notions of
eudaimonia and eudaimonic pluralistically as being potentially
compatible with various different theories of the good life,
including hedonistic, desire-satisfaction and objective-list the-
ories among others. Simply put, as indicated earlier, the notion
of a good life used in this paper is a good life that is in principle
capable of leading to the attainment of eudaimonia. As such,
any theory of a good life capable of leading to eudaimonia can
at least in theory and upon further demonstration be considered
a eudaimonic life. My own theoretical preference is a
eudaimonic life that includes the virtues but that need not
exclude other theories capable of also leading to the attainment
of eudaimonia (its overall axiological goodness).
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define a goof life as any life that is demonstrably
capable of contributing to the attainment of
eudaimonia (the collective term for well-being,
happiness and self-fulfilment).
Formal and Material Conditions for Adequacy
Formal Conditions
Any T-GLAT to be adequate must satisfy as men-
tioned earlier both a formal and a material condition.
To be formally adequate it must be rationally justified,
motivating and practical in the sense of being capable
of resulting in compliance. Justification generally in
decision-making is intended to provide convincing if
not conclusive rational reasons for selecting one
course of action rather than another and in the case
of a T-GLAT, rational reasons for selecting a
particular T-GLAT rather than another. Justified
reasons alone, however, are not sufficient to guide
rational action. That is because rational action
requires that the rational reasons of justification must
also be motivating reasons. For if justificatory reasons
are not motivating they can’t be practical and if they
can’t be practical they are not action-guiding and
hence cannot play a role in the decision-making
process. Thus, the decision-making process requires
reasons for action that are at once justificatory and
motivating.
A crucial point with regard to motivation, however,
is that justificatory reasons need only be capable of
motivating action. They need not and cannot also be
expected to motivate action in every single instance.
Although capable of motivating action in normal
rational agents, motivating justificatory reasons may
nevertheless fail in some instances to motivate
particular agents to act.
In sum, justificatory reasons will count as moti-
vating and thus practical and action guiding if they
are capable of motivating a normal rational person to
act in a certain way, specifically, for the purposes of
this paper acting in giving their rational ascent to a
particular T-GLAT.
In addition, any T-GLAT must be adequately
practical in enabling compliance through informing
policies that can promote its implementation. For a
theoretically adequate T-GLAT that met both the
justification and motivation formal conditions but
was impractical in its application would not succeed
in meeting the formal compliance condition. It would
thus prove insufficient in satisfying its material
conditions as specified above.
Material Conditions
To reiterate, the identified material conditions that any
T-GLAT must address and satisfy for adequacy are
the following:
1. Capacity to address desires;
2. Capacity to meet needs;
3. Capacity to provide means-ends satisfaction;
4. Capacity to contribute to valuable-ends
5. Capacity to preserve moral rights
6. Capacity to be sustainable
7. Capacity to lead to the attainment of eudaimonia
8. Capacity to be practical in providing the ground
for formulating policies in enabling compliance
through its implementation and application.
Roughly, conditions 1 to 4 primarily provide the
context and drive motivation, and 4 to 6 primarily
provide the context and drive justification. Conditions
7 and 8 provide at once the context for motivation and
justification and condition 8 carries most of the
weight for providing adequate compliance in terms
of the practical implementation of a T-GLAT. Thus in
order to be capable of motivation (a necessary formal
condition) any T-GLAT must be capable of evaluating
if and to what degree any technology addresses and
accounts for the desires, needs, mean-end-satisfaction
(or instrumental strategic thinking), and the valuable-
ends (how valuable are the designated ends or goals
promised or afforded by any technology) of actual
agents.
In addition, any T-GLAT must be capable of
providing adequate justification (also a necessary
formal condition) of why such motivating states are
reasonable on the basis of good reasons supporting
those motivating states. Moreover, any T-GLAT must
also be capable of accounting for and providing
adequate justification of how and to what degree
any technology preserves the basic minimal moral
rights owed to every individual person, how and to
what degree any technology is sustainable, and
finally, how and to what degree any technology is
capable of contributing to our individual and collective
eudaimonia as a society.
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of Technology (EMEGOT)
In this section I will propose and defend a eudaimonic
model for evaluating the contribution that technology
makes to the good life (its eudaimonic goodness). In
asking the question, “what is technology good for”,
we can begin by saying that technology has generally
some instrumental goodness as a means to attaining
some functional goal or purpose. The instrumental
goodness of an aeroplane, for example, lies in its
capacity to transport passengers across the globe in
less time than any other available means of commercial
transport, such as boats and trains.
Intrinsic but Conditional Goodness
Technological products and artefacts have some
minimal intrinsic value and goodness by virtue of
their designed-in-agentive-purposiveness (DiAP). It is
conditional on evolving human values and needs but
technologies have no unconditional value or goodness
in themselves [5].
Technology has minimal intrinsic but conditional
value only to the extent that it contributes to meeting
some specified functional human goals or purposes.
So insofar as technology is not good simpliciter,i ti s
good only to the extent that it has the capacity to
contribute to the human good. People have a vast
array of different instrumental goals to which tech-
nology can contribute as a means of achieving those
goals. Is there one ultimate goal that all people value
and desire as an end in itself? It is reasonable to
assume that most if not all people aspire to have a
good life capable of contributing to the attainment of
eudaimonia (self-fulfillment; well-being; happiness;
flourishing). This is in keeping with the Eudemonist
Axiom, the view that “happiness is desired by all
human beings as the ultimate end or telos of all
rational action” ([1], 255).
3
Undoubtedly technology contributes in countless
ways to the good life instrumentally in meeting
evolving needs, desires and valued individual and
collective ends such as transportation, health, wealth,
power, communication, etc. How can we normatively
evaluate technology’s variable instrumental contribu-
tions to the good life? In what follows I will argue
that the answer lies in technology’s capability to
contribute to the attainment of a good life. What value
can we use to normatively evaluate technology’s
capability in contributing to a good life (CCT-GL)?
Wisdom as the Evaluative Principle for Assessing
the Contributing Capability of Technologies
for a Good Life
Insofar as the ultimate goal of a good life is the
attainment of eudaimonia we can evaluate a technol-
ogy’s CCT-GL by ascertaining its capacity for
contributing to a good life for the attainment of
eudaimonia: A technology’s capacity to contribute to
a good life is its Eudaimonic Value. A technology’s
eudaimonic value therefore relates and is directly
proportional to its capacity to contribute to a good
life, capable of leading to the attainment of eudaimo-
nia. In this paper I shall demonstrate that a technol-
ogy’s eudaimonic value can be determined directly by
the application of a model based on the notion of
Wisdom.
In the first instance I define wisdom as a type of
meta-knowledge and an enabling second-order reflec-
tive virtue whose application is capable of guiding
one in conceiving and discovering what a good life is
and applying that knowledge in its active pursuit for
the attainment of eudaimonia. Wisdom provides the
overall answer to the question of why we need to
design and use technologies in general: Because they
are capable of contributing to human eudaimonia. In
addition, wisdom enables us to evaluate the capacity
of specific technologies to contribute to a good life for
the attainment of eudaimonia.
Wisdom as a type of meta-knowledge provides
why-answers—why design and use certain technolo-
gies in the first place; and as an enabling meta-
axiological-virtue for conceiving what a good life is
for the attainment of eudaimonia, wisdom provides
how-answers—how to use those technologies in
pursuit of a good life for the attainment of eudaimonia.
Therefore, wisdom provides a theoretical and practical
model for evaluating why and how certain technologies
are good for us by ascertaining their capability for
contributing to a good life for the attainment of
eudaimonia. This is essentially the core argument of
this paper.
3 Brink attributes the Eudemonic Axiom to Gregory Vlastos in
Vlastos [8] Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press) p. 203.
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technology (understood as a collective term for all
technologies) can be directly related to the notion of a
good life via the concept of wisdom. Insofar as
wisdom is a primary and essential condition for an
individual in (a) determining what a good life is or
ought to be (meta-knowledge- that and meta-
knowledge-why); (b) a primary and essential condi-
tion in providing us with guidance and direction, both
as individuals and societies generally, of how to live
such good lives; and (c) wisdom, as a reflective meta-
virtue, is a disposition of character that practically
enables us to live such good lives for the attainment
of eudaimonia (meta-knowledge-how); to what extent
and in what ways, if any, can wisdom provide
guidance in identifying and evaluating the degree by
which technology contributes to the good life for the
attainment of eudaimonia?
The paper posits that one direct way of evaluating
the value of technology and its capacity to contribute
to a good life generally (its overall axiological
goodness) is by determining the degree to which it
contributes or is capable of contributing to the
attainment of a good life: epistemologically (its
capacity to yield knowledge); ethically (its ability to
contribute to the moral good of others both negatively
by not causing unjustified harm to others, and
positively by causing positive good for others); and
eudaimonically (its capacity to contribute to both the
conception and the attainment of a good life for the
attainment of eudaimonia). The paper will show that
in order to achieve that theoretical objective the
notion of wisdom
4 is essential.
In sum, insofar as the ultimate purpose of a good
life is the attainment of eudaimonia then wisdom,
which informs the conception of a good life and
directs its active pursuit for the attainment of
eudaimonia, is an essential condition for both the
conception and the attainment of a good life.
As the essential condition for both the conception
and guided active pursuit and successful achievement
of the good life, wisdom is therefore established as an
essential conceptual link between technology and the
good life, and in particular for evaluating the
eudaimonic contribution that various technologies
make to a good life. This, in turn, allows us to
determine some of the generic implications and
ramifications of technology for the conception of a
good life, in particular, a eudaimonic conception of a
good life. However, as Kekes points out, “the
eudaimonic conception of a good life is not to be
understood as the endorsement of a particular form of
life. It is rather a regulative ideal that specifies some
general conditions to which all good lives must
conform” [emphasis added] ([3], p. 24).
The eudaimonic account of a good life canvassed
in this paper is broadly speaking pluralistic as it is in
principle compatible with other different conceptions
of a good life that meet the same necessary general
conditions to which any notion of a good life must
conform. For example, insofar as hedonistic, desire-
satisfaction and objective list theories of the good life
meet the minimal conditions for both specifying what
a good life is as well as providing the enabling
conditions for its practical realization, then they too
can be aligned broadly to the notion of wisdom
developed in this paper. To the extent that they meet
those conditions, they too can be used to determine
the contributive capability of technologies to a good
life.
Wisdom as Meta-technology of the Self
Insofar as technologies with a positive eudaimonic
value are contributive instrumental means to the end
or telos for having a good life, and wisdom is the
meta-knowledge (second–order knowledge) for pro-
viding the conception of a good life and guiding its
realisation, wisdom can be considered as a meta-
technology of the self. For it provides both the
theoretical and practical means for the conception,
design and realisation of a good life for the end for
attaining eudaimonia. The means to the realisation of
a good life may include and often does include first-
order technologies such as computers, for example. If
computers can be considered as extensions of the self
then the degree by which they form part of the self
also becomes a question concerning wisdom. How
and to what degree computers as extension of the self,
contribute to a good life for the attainment of
eudaimonia.
To the extent that first-order technologies provide
the means for making our lives better by contributing
to a good life and wisdom provides the means as a
meta-technology of the self for enabling human beings
4 For an extensive discussion of what wisdom is and some
different types of notions of wisdom see Spence [4].
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then clearly wisdom as a meta-technology should
direct the choice and design of first-order technologies;
for those will be the technologies that will have the
highest eudaimonic value and the highest capacity for
making a positive contribution to a good life.
A Sustainable Good Life and Technology
5
A good life in the 21
st century should be a sustainable
good life. In the past the issue of sustainability and
that of a good life could have been perceived as two
conceptually distinct and practical issues that could
have been dealt with independently of each other.
However, that is no longer the case. Since at least the
Kyoto Protocol the problem of sustainability has been
the central focus of social, scientific and political
debate. As examples of sustainable technologies,
consider the dual-flush toilet and shower-heads that
are designed for saving water, recycling of water,
recycling of consumables, such as plastic, glass and
paper, installation of electrical household appliances
as well as the design and production of transport
vehicles including cars, buses, trains and aeroplanes
that are more energy efficient (the new Dreamliner
made entirely of carbon fibre for more energy
efficiency is a case in point).
In all these examples, what seems crucial, however,
is the role that people’s desires play in motivating
compliance with energy saving technologies. People
must want to comply and moreover be persuaded that
there are justified reasons for complying with such
technological energy-saving policies and practices for
the policies and practices to work. The installation of
an energy-consumption metre inside one’s home, for
example, that allows the monitoring of the overall
energy consumption of a household would be a
practical technological device for encouraging com-
pliance with efficient energy use. Crucially, however,
individuals must first be motivated to want to install
such a device within their homes. Such initial
motivation can best be primed by rationally targeting
the consumers’ desires [6].
The eudaimonic model for evaluating the goodness
of technology (EMEGOT), which relates the good-
ness of technology to its eudaimonic value though its
capability to contribute to a good life, is able to
motivate people’s rational desires for a good life. It
does so though its ability to demonstrate that,
although life is not indefinitely sustainable, an
unsustainable life for a projected defined period
cannot be good as it is potentially self-defeating and
incapable of leading to eudaimonia. By creating its
own unsustainable desires, by an ever increasing
plethora of technological devices that consume rather
than preserve scarce resources and are thus non-
sustainable in a technological world of ever diminish-
ing resources, it would be wise to design and make
technologies that are compliant to the conditions for a
sustainable good life. This could be accomplished by
designing technologies that are capable of contributing
to a sustainable good life for the attainment of
eudaimonia.
We need to shift the focus from the epistemic value
of technologies, their ability to contribute to knowl-
edge or information (as in the case of communication
and information technologies) for knowledge’s sake,
to that of their eudaimonic value, their ability to
contribute to a sustainable good life capable or
leading to eudaimonia. To do that, we need to design
technologies wisely and that in turn requires that we
enable ourselves to become wiser through designing
and promoting meta-technologies of the self that
enhance our capacity for wisdom. Revisiting and
revitalising the ancient philosophies of Plato, Aristotle,
the Epicureans, the Stoics and even the Sceptics, that
were essentially practical philosophies of the good life
for the attainment of eudaimonia, might be a good place
to start.
ApplicationoftheEudaimonicModelforEvaluating
the Goodness of Technologies
The primary aim of this paper has been to develop a
meta-normative model whose primary purpose is to
determine the essential conditions that any normative
theory of the Good Life and Technology (T-GLAT)
must adequately address in order to be able to account
for, explain and evaluate the Contributive Capability
of Technology for the Good Life (CCT-GL). I have
argued in section (3) that my prosed Eudaimonic
Model is an adequate normative model for evaluating
the contribution that technology makes to the good
life (its eudaimonic goodness) for it meets both the
5 For an extensive discussion of a sustainable good life see
Spence [6].
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ditions for such an axiological evaluation. However,
as I emphasized above, my choice of a eudaimonic
model based on the concept of wisdom, does not of
itself exclude other possible normative models that
may also prove adequate. It is beyond the scope of
this paper, however, to apply the Eudaimonic Model
to evaluate the capability of specific technologies to
contribute to a good life—that is, to evaluate their
specific CCT-GL.
It is reasonable to assume pending a further detailed
examination that different technologies will have a
variable CCT-GL—some higher, others lower—which
will vary according to the specific function and use of
those technologies. For example, the use of some
communication and information technologies, such as
the internet and smart-phones, by some individuals may
prove self-defeating by causing more harm than good to
those individuals. Take for instance the practice of
sexting. In the recent case of the USA ex-congressman
Anthony Wiener, it forced his resignation from office
and spelled the end of his political career. It can be said
that the specific use of that particular technology in
those circumstances, was not conducive to the good life
of Weiner (at least as he may have conceived it to
be at that time). It may also have not been
conducive to the good life of many other Internet
and smart-phone users who have similarly engaged
in self-defeating digital communication behaviour
resulting in unintended self-harm.
Other technologies such as automated predator
drones used in war will require a more complex
analysis to determine their CCT-GL. However, their
capability for contributing to a good life should still
be the overall guiding evaluative principle to be
applied in normatively assessing those technologies.
Determining the different general types of technologies
and their corresponding CCT-GL according to their
different functions and uses will make a worthwhile
topic for further research.
Conclusion
The eudaimonic model for evaluating the goodness of
technology (EMEGOT) proposed in this paper is an
adequate theory for evaluating the capability of
technologies to contribute to a good life because it
meets the essential formal and material conditions of
an adequate theory of the Good Life and Technology
(T-GLAT).
First, it meets the formal conditions of justification,
motivation and compliance: Justification, because the
three essential categories that comprise the notion of
wisdom, the epistemic, the ethical and the eudai-
monic, are at once the essential normative categories
required for evaluating the capability of technologies
for contributing to a good life; Motivation, because
the notion of wisdom is capable of linking the
normative evaluation of technologies directly to the
notion of a good life and eudaimonia, which are
highly valued practical objectives for most people—
for most people wish to have a good life and to be
happy; Wisdom also satisfies the compliance condi-
tion. For by being capable to directly link the
contribution that technologies make to a good life,
wisdom offers a practical measure for developing
policies that can direct and guide the design of
emerging technologies (including nanotechnologies)
according to their eudaimonic value for the well-being
of society.
Second, EMEGOT is also capable of meeting the
material formal conditions of an adequate theory. It
can address and account for desires and needs in
terms of both their instrumental means and final ends,
since wisdom relates those to the two highly valued
aspirational objectives of a good life and eudaimonia.
Finally, EMEGOT is capable of addressing and
accounting for the material conditions of moral rights
and sustainability, for wisdom as a meta-reflective-
virtue also supports and promotes those essential
material conditions. For as I have argued in this paper
wisdom directs that a good life in the 21
st century and
beyond must of necessity be a sustainable life.
With regard to nanotechnologies, EMEGOT
seems particularly useful in evaluating their ability
to contribute to a good life since some of the
potential effects and consequences of some nano-
technologies cannot be assessed with any degree
of certainty at present. For example, concern for
the use of nanoparticles in cosmetics and
sunscreens has been raised, as these particles can
penetrate the skin and lodge in various parts of the
body potentially causing harm such as inducing
certain forms of cancer [9]. Though still unproven,
such concerns should give us pause. We should more
reflectively examine the potential risks associated
with such nanotechnologies and evaluate their
342 Nanoethics (2011) 5:335–343potential benefits not primarily in terms of what new
knowledge they give rise to but primarily in terms of
the potential contribution they make to a good life
(their eudaimonic value).
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